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Gerald Korngold* 
Sanborn v. McLean: A Strange 
Tale of Inquiry Notice and 
Implied Burdens 
Life in American cities at the turn of the 20th century was a ti1rn~ of' 
growth, eneq.,,y, turbulence, and transformation. Industrialization of the 
Northern cities, a trend begun in the 19th century, continued relentless-
ly. The economic growth that had propelled the United States from a 
rural backwater in 1800 to the leading industrial power in 1900 contin-
ued, and American firms began to take a leadership role in the world 
economy. Thousands of immigrants from across the oceans and from the 
rural areas of the United States crowded into noisy, bustling cities 
seeking employment in the new factories and chasing their piece of the 
American dream. Noise, pollution, traffic, disease, and social dislocation 
grew exponentially in this environment. 
People with resources sought housing arrangements that would 
serve as a refuge from the increasingly hectic commercial and industrial 
world. They wished for quiet residential arnas, with nice homes and tree 
lined streets, free from the intrusions of" business establishments. These 
owners often believed that these idyllic settings would lead to a helter 
life and reinforce moral values for their families, and they sought to raise 
their families in an area with similarly-minded people. 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, covenants recorded 
against land were the chief vehicle to achieve residential districts with 
building requirements and use restrictions. Whether enforced by injunc-
tion as "equitable servitudes" or for money damages as "real cove-
nants," covenants could bind not only current hut also future owners to 
the restrictive scheme, thus preserving the residential arrangement for 
:, l'rofr•ssor of' Law, New York Law Sd10ol; Visiting l<',•llow. Lincoln I nsLit.ulP ol' Land 
Policy. Camb1·iclgc, Massachus<'t.ls. 
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an unlimited period of time. These doctrines were necessary since the 
concepts of contract law did not allow for enforcement of promises 
against subsequent owners of the burdened land who never expressly 
agreed to be bound by subsequent owners of the benefited land who were 
never expressly given the promise benefit. The changes in the law that 
later made public land use regulation, such as zoning, a means to shape 
neighborhoods had not yet occurred-that would not happen until the 
1920s and the 19:30s. Covenants and servitudes thus offered landowners 
in the first part of the twentieth century the only available means to 
protect their neighborhoods from commercial or industrial intrusion. 
To be binding, a covenant must be valid under the requirements of 
covenants law. But there is a key second requirement: to be bound by a 
covenant (or any other property interest) previously established against 
a piece of property, future purchasers of the burdened land must have 
notice of the restrictions the covenants imposed before they commit to 
buying the land. Notice allows them to decide whether they actually 
want to buy land that is limited to residential uses and, if so, to tailor 
their negotiating position by offering a lower price to reflect the loss of 
unfettered use of the land. The law is clear: if a purchaser of a lot does 
not have notice of covenants burdening the land's use, the purchaser is 
not hound. 
The leading case of Sanborn u. McLean I arose in this context of late 
19th century urban development, private a1c,rreements to create residen-
tial oases, and the importance of notice to constrain free use of property. 
Sanborn includes multiple stories, some official, some not. There is, of 
courne, the narrative of the case and its decision as set out for us by the 
Supreme Court of' Michigan. I will relate that story but also tell you why 
that narrative seems to have big gaps in it, both in terms of the factual 
background that the court chose to recite and the legal reasoning that 
the court applied. On the two legal issues the court faced-whether the 
land was bound by a residential restriction and whether the subsequent 
purchaser had notice of the restriction-the court made illogical, unprec-
edented, and (at least on the notice issue) wrong decisions. 
That will lead us to other possible narratives within Sanborn u. 
McLean which I f'eel go a long way to explain how the case was decided 
and why the court's official story seems so wrong. The first seems to be a 
tale of zoning by judicial fiat, without the benefit of legislative process 
and guidelines or constitutional protections. The second appears to be a 
1 2:l:\ Mich. 227. 20(i N.W. -19(i 1192:il. Sanhorn has hPc;n citc·d by nunwrous courts. 
SP<\ ,•.g., lfoach v. WPsl Indies Inv. Co., f)4 F. Supp.2d (1:34, (i:37 ID.VJ. 2000); Clan9 v. 
l{PckPr, ,tG:i l'a. -1:i2. 4:i'1, :l H, J\.2d 898, 900 I 1974); Shipyard Property Owners' Ass'n v. 
Mangiaracina. :m7 S.C. 299. :)ml, -114 S.K2d 7%, 802 !App.); Bowers Welding & Hotshot, 
Inc v. Broml,•y, (if)() 1'.2d 299, :HJ4 1Wyo. 198:i). 
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story of professional courtesy or sycophancy, where precedent and !'acts 
may have been sacrificed to favor a powerful person. 
The Story told by the Michigan Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court or Michigan issued its opinion in Sanborn v. 
McLean in December of 1925. The court's story began in 1891 in Detroit 
with Robert and Joseph McLaughlin subdividing land that they owned 
into building lots, creating the Green Lawn Subdivision. The court 
discussed only the 91 lots of Green Lawn that [i·onkd on Collingwood 
Avenue between Hamilton Boulevard to the west and Woodward Avenue 
to the east, although reference to the McLaughlin's recorded plat shows 
that the subdivision contained a similar number of lots on a street 
(Lawrence Avenue) parallel to Collin1--,rwood. 2 Fifty-three of the 91 lots i!'l 
the subdivision had express covenants in their deeds limiting the lots to 
residential uses. The case, however, only describes 21 conveyances by the 
McLaughlins with express restrictions, with it unclear who ec3tablished 
the express restrictions on the other lots. 
The court described Collin1,,rwood Avenue at the time of the case as 
"a high grade residence street between Woodward avenue and Hamilton 
boulevard, with single, double, and apartment houses.":1 The houses 
fronted on Collin1--,rwood, and an alley ran behind them, emptying into 
side streets. John A. McLean purchased the west ;35 feet of lot 86 "in 
1910 or 1911." He bought the property not f'rom the McLaughlins 
directly but from owners who had bought the property after the 
McLaughlins had conveyed it. 1 Neither the original deed that tht> 
McLaughlins gave for lot 86 nor the subsequent deeds for that lot, 
including the one to McLean, contained any residential restrictive cove-
nants.0 At the time of purchase, there was a partly completed house on 
2 hltp:,,/www.cis.slale.rni.us,, platmaps/dt_imagt'.asp?BC('._Sl I 1-ll N IJEX = 1 00G:l. 
:1 20G N .W.2d al 49G. 
1 Id. at 4\J7. Thl' stipulatl'd facts in llw l{l'rnrd indicall' that tlw det•d lo tlw prnp<'1t,, 
was isslll'd to ,John McLl'an I along with his wif,,J only in IH18, hy Sarah A. (;n'llS<'l. ]{l'rnrd 
lkfore the Suprenw Cou1·t or the Stall' or Michigan, No. :l2,0D4 illw "'l{l'rnrd"I. at /42. Th,, 
1910 or 1911 datt, lik,,ly n·li.'rs lo llw clat,, in which McLt•an L'XPrnlPd a rnnlract or salt> lo 
purchasl' Uw propt•rly. St>t' Tl'sl imony or lvkLt•an, l{l'rnrcl, al I 17, wlwn· Md,t•an lt>slilit>cl 
that ht> bought the properly ·'about f'ourlt'l'n y<'ars" lll'forl' thl' 192,1 litigation and that 
during the "first ypar llwl paid Wall.Pr(;. Set•ly on tlw contrnd, latPr on tlH' rnnlrad was 
lrn11sfl•1Ted lo Sarnh. /\. (;n,u,wl." St•ely received tlw prop,•rly in llen•mlwr 1910. and 
convey,·d it lo Cn•usel in 191:l. In 1\)21 ,John McLean quitclainwcl his inlt>rnsl in tlw 
property to his wift, Christina. lkcord. at 41-42. Importantly, it is tlw tinw or tlw signing 
or the contract or sak when tlw huyt>r acquin•s his int<'rt'sl in tlw propt•rty for tht' pu1-post' 
or notice, even though the eked follows at a latt,r datt>. 
,; Neither the contract nor the May 1, 1892 deed to lht> original purchaser or lot 86, 
Clark A. Serviss, conlai1wd any n·striction. Ihil'f. for Dt•fondants and Appc>llants, Supn•nu, 
Court or tlw State or Michigan. No. :12,mJ4, at 4, :14. 
► 
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the lot which McLean finished and occupied at the time of the litigation 
with his wife, Christina McLean. The McLean property was located on 
the northeast corner of Collingwood Avenue and Second Boulevard. 
The case arose when the McLeans began building a gasoline filling 
station on the back portion of their lot. Jessie Sanborn and other 
homeowners on Collingwood brought an action against the McLeans and 
their contractor before Judge George 0. Driscoll in Chancery division of 
Wayne County Circuit Court, seeking to enjoin the construction. Judge 
Driscoll held for the plaintiffs and ordered the McLeans to tear down the 
work that already had been done. The McLeans appealed to the Supreme 
Court. Plaintiffs maintained on appeal that the gas station would be a 
nuisance per se, it would violate a "general plan fixed for use of all lots 
on the street for residence purposes only," and that the McLeans' land 
was subject to a "reciprocal negative easement" prohibiting the use as a 
gas station. 1; The McLeans countered that no restriction appeared in 
their chain of title, that they purchased without notice of any reciprocal 
negative easement, and denied that there was a nuisance per se. 
The Supreme Court did not address the issue of nuisance. Thus, the 
first question for the court was whether defendants' land was bound by a 
restrictive covenant that would prevent non-residential uses. The court 
held that the land was indeed burdened by a reciprocal negative ease-
ment and upheld plaintiffs' judgment. The court declared that the 91 
plats platted in 1891 were "designed for and each one sold solely for 
residence purpose. " 7 How did this happen even though there were no 
restrictions in defendants' chain of title (or in 38 of the 91 lots' chains of 
title)? According to the court, through the doctrine of reciprocal negative 
easements: 
Ii If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation, 
sells one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained, the 
servitude becomes mutual, and, during the period of restraint, the 
owner of the lot or lots retained can do nothing forbidden to the 
owner of the lot sold.s 
So, when the McLaughlins sold the first lots on Collinwood with 
restrictions, the McLaughlins' retained lots 0ot 86 and all of the rest) 
became impressed with the same restrictions as included in the first sold 
lots at that point in time. It is that reciprocal negative easement that ran 
with the land to the initial and subsequent purchasers of lot 86 (and the 
other lots as welll. Following the logic of the court, there was no need to 
re-create the restriction by placing it in the lot 86 deeds~it had already 
1i Id. at 496-497. 
7 Id. at 497. 
"Id. 
> 
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been created at the dawn of the subdivision based on the restrictions in 
other lots that were conveyed by the subdividers. 
The court made clear that reciprocal negative easements arise out of 
the grantor's acts and intent in the initial stages of the development: 
Such a scheme of restrictions must start with a common owner; it 
cannot arise and fasten upon one lot by reason of other lot owners 
conforming to a general plan. If a reciprocal negative easement 
attached to defendants' lot, it was fastened thereto while in the 
hands of the common owner of it and neighboring lots by way of sale 
of other lots with restrictions beneficial at that time to it.!I 
What was the evidence of the McLaughlins' intent to create an 
implied reciprocal negative easement against the entire subdivision? The 
only evidence cited by the court (or in the record) was that the 21 lots 
sold prior to lot 86 contained residential restrictions, even though the 
court also noted that after the sale of lot 86 some of the McLaughlins' 
conveyances included express restrictions and others did not (remember 
only 53 of 91 had a restriction). The court was unclear on how it 
determined that the McLaughlins initially intended to create an implied 
restriction scheme, leaving much to surmise and a retrospective view of 
events to try to determine the grantors' original intent: 
The original plan was repeatedly declared in subsequent sales of lots 
by restrictions in the deeds, and, while some lots sold were not so 
restricted, the purchasers thereof, in every instance, observed the 
general plan and purpose of the restrictions in building residences. 
For upward of 30 years the united efforts of all persons interested 
have carried out the common purpose of making and keeping all the 
lots strictly for residences, and defendants are the first to depart 
therefrom. 111 
Once the court found that lot 86 was subject to a restriction, it then 
had to deal with the second issue: notice. The Michigan Supreme Court 
recognized the traditional rule that a purchaser of an interest in real 
property is only bound by prior interests and claims against the property 
if' the purchaser had notice of the interest prior to buying. Bona fide 
purchasers (i.e., takers without notice of prior rights) take free of the 
prior interests. Thus, the McLeans would be bound by the reciprocal 
negative easement only if John McLean had notice of it before he made 
the agreement to purchase the land. Prevailing on this issue was 
essential for plaintiffs~it would do them no good to win a covenant right 
if they could not enforce it against a bona fide purchaser. 
!I Id. 
10 Id. 
, 
Ill 
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Notice can be "actual" or "constructive." "Actual" notice is what it 
sounds like-the purchaser actually knows of the prior interest, as when 
someone tells the purchaser of the earlier rights. There is no evidence of 
actual notice in Sanborn. "Constructive" notice can be one of two 
types-"rccord" notice or "inquiry" notice. A purchaser is deemed to 
have record notice of any interest in a properly recorded instrument in 
the chain of title of the property in question. Record notice was impossi-
ble in Sanborn since there was no express covenant right that could have 
been recorded in the chain of title for lot 86. 
That left inquiry notice for the Sanborn court. Inquiry notice works 
as follows: the law presumes that every purchaser makes a reasonable 
inspection of property before buying and then makes reasonable inquiry 
about potential competing ownership claims that the physical inspection 
revealed. 11 A classic example is that a potential buyer would inspect the 
property, notice that someone other than seller is on the land, inquire of 
that person, and learn that the person holds a (prior) ten year lease. 
Failure to make the inspection and inquiry does not help the purchaser, 
as the law attributes to her the information that she would have learned 
whether or not she actually does what is required. 
The court in Sanborn concluded that John McLean had inquiry 
notice of the reciprocal negative casement binding lot 86. The court's 
"logic" ran as follows as to what a reasonable "inspection" would have 
revealed: there was a partially built dwelling on the lot when he 
purchased; he had an abstract of title that told him that there had been 
a common grantor and that there were 97 additional lots; 1i although he 
was told by his seller that his lot was not restricted, 1'1 "Ihle could not 
avoid noticing the strictly uniform residence character given the lots by 
the expensive dwellings thereon."" 
According to the court, from these facts, "the least inquiry would 
have quickly developed the fact that lot 86 was subjected to a reciprocal 
negative easement." 1;; What would such an inquiry have entailed? The 
court explained that McLean did not have to ask his neighbors about a 
11 Sec, e.g., Strace1wr v. Bailey, 7:l7 S.W.2d G:36, s:rn l'l'Pnn. App. 19861. 
ll I IPn, the eourt. eonternplat(•s a tot.al of' 98 lots fronting Collingwood, rat.h('r than 91 
that it. used pn•viously. 98 is consistent. with t.lw recorded plat., see ht.t.p://www.cis.stat.c•.mi. 
us/plat.maps/dLimage.asp?BCC_Sl/llINDEX= 1005:l ilast. visited .Jum• 28, 2008) and t.lw 
Abstract of' TitlP in t.lw l{ecord. supra notp 4, at 202-:W:l. 
1
'
1 It is unc!Par to llH' how being told that. the lot. was unrestricted helps to put onP on 
inquiry of' a n,st.riction, yl'l t.lw court. c.:iU•s this fad. 206 N.W.2d at 498. 
II Id. 
i;, Id. 
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restriction but "had he inquired he would have found of record the 
reason for such general conformation. " 11; 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided for the plaintiffs on 
the two key issues~first, they found that the defendants' lot was bound 
by a restrictive covenant barring non-residential use such as the pro-
posed gasoline station. Then the court held that the defendants had 
inquiry notice of the restriction when they bought and thus were bound 
by it. Ii 
Why the Decision is a Troubling Departure 
The Michigan Supreme Court illogically stretched precedent to f'ind 
for the plaintiffs in Sanborn on both the existence of the restriction and 
the determination of notice. The results are puzzling in light of existing 
law and sound policy. The Sanborn court did not have to reach these 
results, and certainly courts today should not repeat these errors. This 
section will show that Sanborn stands on the outer edge of decisions on 
reciprocal negative easements and inquiry notice, and I will offer an 
alternative story that the Sanborn court should have told. In a subse-
quent section I will give my surmises as to why the Michigan Supreme 
Court chose to tell the story that it did to render its flawed decision. 
Reciprocal Negative Easement 
"Reciprocal negative easements" are a subset of covenants running 
with the land (known more specifically as equitable servitudes and real 
covenants). 1·' Covenants law focuses on automatically moving the bur-
dens and benefits of promises by current landowners to successor owners 
of the parcels of the original covenanting parties. A typical case involves 
two neighbors, A and B. A wants to ensure that B will not build a store 
or factory on her property, so A pays B to expressly promise ( in a 
recorded instrument) to restrict the use of her land to residences; the 
law of covenants allows C, a successor owner of A's parcel, to bring an 
action for an injunction or damages if D, the successor owner of B's land, 
violates the covenant (such as by building a gas station on a lot 
restricted to residential use). 
11; Id. 
Ii Though Uw court uplwld thl' plaintif'f,-;' posit ion. it modif'i,•d t ht' 01·d,•1· 1·,•q11iring tlw 
paitially built building to lw torn down by allowing t.h,· ch•f'l'ndants to rdain portions that 
could !Jl' usl'd for rl'sid,·ntial purposl's. 
IH OldPr courts ollPn usP tlw (t,rm "1wgat.ive casPmPnt." as s,vnonym,ius with "cm·,•n,u1t 
running with t.lw land.'' Sl'<' (;,,raid Korngold. l'ri\'atl' Land lls,• Arrang,,111,•nts: 1,:asP-
menls, Ikal Covunants and Equitable !-,prvit udes ~ 8.01, 290--291 12d ,,d. 20041. 
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This is essentially what went on in Sanborn v. McLean with one 
important difference-there was no express covenant binding lot 86! 
None of the owners of lot 86-starting with the initial grantee from the 
McLaughlins through the intermediate owners to John McLean--ex-
prcssly a6,-:reed to be bound by a restriction. No such covenant appears in 
the chain of title-as we will see later, if it had been recorded before 
McLean bought, we could presume or imply that he consented to be 
bound. What is remarkable, therefore, about Sanborn is not the use of 
the concept "reciprocal negative easement" but that the court implied 
such a restriction against the McLeans' property. From the position of 
the McLeans and prior owners of lot 86, the court created a covenant 
where none had existed. 111 
There are many excellent reasons to enforce express private land uHe 
arrangements, such as covenants and easements (both collectively re-
ferred to in the parlance of the Third Restatement of Property-Servi-
tudes as "servitudes). None, however, apply where there is no consent to 
the covenant by the burdened owner. 
Eff'icicncy. Enforcing freely-made agreements restricting the use of 
land helps to achieve an efficient allocation of our limited land resources. 
By allowing parties to buy and sell partial rights in land, such as 
covenants, the purchaser is able to acquire only the rights that she 
wants in the property. He does not have to overinvest and buy a fee 
intereHt when a covenant is all that he needs and wants. So, continuing 
with our earlier example, if the law of covenants did not validate the 
purchaSl) of the restriction between A and B, A would have to buy a fee 
interest in B's land in order to prevent commercial or industrial uses 
next door. This would divert A's resources from other pursuits. More-
over, B is perfectly happy with continuing to own his property in fee, 
subject to the residential covenant, but with the extra cash from A-
everyone gets what he or she wants. 
The benefits of such efficiency-maximizing contracts will accrue not 
only to A and B but also to successor owners C and D. Assuming that C 
and D are aware of the covenant, they will adjust the price they are 
willing to pay for their lots accordingly. C will pay A extra for the land to 
reflect the value of the covenant, allowing A to recover his investment 
and D will pay B less reflecting the burden of the restriction thus 
preventing B from getting paid twice for the covenant right. To make an 
efficiency justification work, however, it is essential that the original 
parties consent to the terms of the deal. The consent of subsequent 
111 lfrciprocal n,•gative Pas,,nwnt theory can be used in far less contrnversial settings. 
For example, wlwn tlwre are ,·xpress rnvenants in all lots in a subdivision, the theory can 
I)(' usPd to justif:v enforcenwnt hy prior purchasprs against latter purchasers. See Korngold, 
supra not!' 17. * 9.09. Sanhorn v. McLpan is a f'ar mon· difficult casp since t.lwrc was no 
,•xpn•ss covpnant against lot 86 and so one had to be implied. 
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owners to pre-existing covenants can be presumed only if they have 
notice of the restriction before making their deal. 
These efficiency benefits will result only from consensual transac-
tions based on good inf'ormation--where the parties voluntarily exchange 
promises and consideration in a /'rec market. If the law imposes addition-
al, iwJwown obligations on the parties and re-arranges the deal, the 
market will not operate efficiently. This is what the court did wrong in 
Sanborn-it created a restriction that had never been agreed to and 
imposed it on McLean who had no notice of it. McLean suffered most 
immediately but the entire real estak transactions system is chilled hy 
such decisions. 
J,ibcrty. People can exercise tlwir freedom of' choice and control over 
their own property by entering into consensual covlmant agreements. 
Successor owners who buy with notice of these arrangements are 
deemed to be making these choices as well. These expressions of' owner-
ship rights should be respected except in rare instances where there are 
strong overriding public policies.2'1 
When the law imposes a covenant on an owner who did not consent, 
the owner's property rights are being limited by the coercive power of 
government. This offends notions of fairness, reliance, and ownership. 
Subdivision covenants. Developers who use the correct legal tech-
niques can, and do, create large-scale covenant arrangements in subdivi-
sions. They can su~jcct all lots to express covE'nants rehrulating, for 
example, use of' the properties, types and styles of building, lot arrange-
ment and setback, etc. Such covenants would expressly provide for a 
mutual and reciprocal right of' enforcement by each lot against the oilwr. 
This arrangement would bring the benefits to all lots of a residential 
neighborhood, offsetting the loss of' value due to the restrictions on free 
use of' the property. Indeed, many subdivision schemes actually increase 
the value of the lots, since potential buyers value the restrictions 
imposed on their neighbors more than they value the rc•ciprocal restric-
tions they accept themselves. Someone who has no intention of painting 
his house purple, for example, would price a covenant not to do so close 
to zero. That same person might be willing to pay quite a bit to ensure 
that none of his neighbors could paint their houses purple. These 
covenants would be placed in recorded instruments, providing notice of 
the restrictions before purchasers bought their interests. Note the kl!Y 
ingredients in this scenario that were missing in Sanborn-the express 
covenant and the recorded document. 
Implied covenants in Sanborn. Covenant enforcement can be justi-
fied, therefore, only when they arc created by consent. When there is no 
211 Sep Korngold, supra not<' 17, * 10.02 !describing raeial ,·ovpnants and ,·m,Pnants 
barring group honws as violating puhlie policy I. 
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express indicator of such consent (i.e., an express agreement, preferably 
written) the inference is that no consensual arrangement was made. 
Thus, when a court proceeds in the absence of express consent and seeks 
to imply consent, it must proceed extremely carefully. 
The decision of the Sanborn court to imply a reciprocal negative 
easement is surprising in light of these concerns. It is also surprising in 
light of the precedents on covenants available to the Sanborn court. 
Courts deciding covenant cases, including those in Michigan, often 
express a distrust of restrictions on land. Thus, for example, the Su-
preme Court of Michigan declared in 1905 that "Ii It is the general rule 
that restrictions on property will be construed strictly against those 
claiming to enforce them, and all doubts resolved in favor of the free use 
of" the property. " 21 This statement has been repeated in numerous 
Michigan cases before and after Sanhorn. 22 This statement teaches a 
powerful lesson. Covenants can indeed bring benefits. At the same time, 
they pose a risk of deterring sales and development if holdouts refuse to 
consent to release of covenants in the future or if the transaction costs of 
removing restrictions become excessive. Implying covenants poses an 
even greater disincentive to land markets and development because 
owners and potential buyers are now subject to vague, unpredictable, 
and perhaps unascertainable agreements binding the property?1 The 
integrity of the record system is eroded by validating unrecorded inter-
ests. 
The court opens the door to these problems in Sanborn, without 
adequately considering the cost to the system and whether the benefits 
to the other owners and society are worth the price. Remember that all 
along, if the McLaughlins had desired to create residential covenants 
binding all lots, they could have done so easily and inexpensively by 
recording provisions in all of the deeds. Purchasers could have refused to 
buy lots unless this scheme was expressly created. 
Moreover, the cases cited by the Michigan Supreme Court in San-
born do little to support the implication of a restriction against a 
subsequent purchaser of a lot without an express covenant. Rather, 
these cases deal with other issues. For example, Allen u. City of" Detroit2 1 
involved an action against a subdivider who had orally expressly prom-
21 Janws v. Irvine, 141 Mich. :)76, 104 N.W. fi:ll, fi:J2-o:i:i (lfJ0G1. 
22 SP<,. P.g., City of" Livonia v. Department of" Social S<·rvic,Js, 42:l Mich. 466, :l78 
N.W.2d 402 I l\J8GI; Bos(.on-Edison l'roU•ctive Ass'n v. l'aulist l<'athers, :l06 Mich. 2!i:l, 10 
N.W.2d 847 1194:)J; Casturt.on v. Plot.kin, 188 Mich. :l:l:l, l!i4 N.W. l!il I HllGJ. 
2:1 The <il·cision also allows the cn·ation of an inten,st. in real propt>r!.y ( i.l'., tlw 
n,ciprocal ,wgative <,as<'m<•ntJ without a writing, thus contradicting the Statute of Frauds. 
21 167 Mich. 464, 1:i:l N.W. :ll 7 I 19111. i"or a similar set of facts, again difforent from 
Sanborn but. yet cited for support by the Supreme Court, Sl'<' McQuade v. Wilcox, 216 Mich. 
:J02, 18:l N.W. 771 I 19211. 
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ised to bind his retained land under residential restrictions similar to 
those that he placed on the lots that he conveyed to the plaintiffa. The 
plaintiffs, who were original grantees of the subdivider, sued when he 
attempted to sell two retained lots without restrictions. Allen was a quite 
different case than Sanborn, as there was evidence of an express promise 
by the subdivider. It also did not involve enforcement against a remote 
purchaser of an unrestricted lot, but was more in the nature or an 
estoppel/consumer protection action against an overreaching developer 
who had made an express promise to be bound by a covenant. 
Even if one were to favor the Michigan Supreme Court's test, a fair 
reading of the facts presented by the court do not show a clear general 
plan by the McLaughlins that could he the basis of implying a reciprocal 
negative easement. So much does not add up. For example, how could 
there have been a general plan if only 53 of the 91 lots had restrictions 
in their chains of title? This is merely 58</r of the properties, and this is 
not a case where covenants were mistakenly omitted from a few lois. 
One would think that the numbers alone counter the finding of' an intent 
to create a general plan. The opinion cites no other evidence that might 
support the finding of an intent to create a general plan, such as sales 
brochures, advertisements, testimony of real estate agents, written and 
oral statements of the McLaughlins, contracts of sale, etc. from the Lime 
that the McLaughlins planned and began marketing the dt•velopment.~~, 
The evidence of a general plan in the opinion is weak or nonexistent; in 
fact, it is negated by that 58'/r number.~'; Given this dubious evidence or 
intent and the law's favoring of free use of land, the court's finding of a 
general plan~the lynchpin of the reciprocal negative easement argu-
ment~is curious and misguided. 
Inquiry notice 
The court took an unprecedented and wrong view of inquiry notice 
to find that John McLean knew of the implied covenant when he 
purchased the property. This is tNident from the court's own nmdition of 
the facts as well as additional information from the record. 
Notice the01y. One of the major advances of the American land 
transactions system was the development of recording acts and title 
operations early in our history.~' The recording acts serve various func-
'!.., Latl•1· <:ascs n•liPd on such evidPnl"l'. S,,,-, l'.g., W,•IJl•r v. L,·s l'l•till' i\ead,•111i,•s. Inc., 
G48 S.W.2d 847 !Mo. App. J!)7(il; l{iver Birch i\ssocs. v. City of' lfal,,igli, :l:W N.C. 100, :lS8 
S.K2d G:l8 ilfl!lOI: Lehmann v. Wallac<', filO S.W.2d H7fi ITPx.Ci,·.App. ID711. 
'!.6 [roni<:ally. l'laintifT Sanborn's lot did not <'Vl'll havl' an ,•xpn•ss co,·,•nant l"l'l"<ll"<i<-d 
against it. l{ccord, supra not,, 4, at. G7-G8, (i6-(i8. 
'!.i On thl' n,cording acts and t.lw policil's, Sl'l' (;l'rald Korngold & l'aul (;oJdstpin. !{,·al 
!•:stale Transactions: Cases and Mall-rials on Land Transf,•r, lk\'l·lopnwnt and Finam·,, 
244-:l4G 14th Pd. 20021. 
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tions. First, the recording system protects owners of property interests 
by providing an opportunity to record, so giving the entire world record 
notice of their rights and making them superior to those of others. 
Second, it penalizes owners who fail to record, by allowing subsequent 
purchasers to prevail over unrecorded interests-this creates a powerful 
incentive for people to record. Moreover, the common law rule of "first 
in time, first in right" that existed prior to the recording acts would 
favor the prior interest holder even if the subsequent purchaser had no 
knowledge of the prior interest, thus making potential purchasers reluc-
tant to engage in exchanges. Under the recording acts, in contrast, 
market transactions are encouraged since purchasers can invest with 
confidence and potential deal makers can identify owners of potential 
target properties and engage in negotiations with them. An active, 
secure real estate market brings efficiency benefits to society. 
These policies favoring the recording system, i.e., protecting those 
that follow recording procedure and punishing thm,e that do not, are 
tempered by the portions of the doctrines of actual and inquiry notice 
based on fairness considerations. So, though A has not recorded, if B 
actually knows or should know of A, it seems wrong to allow B to prevail 
over A's prior property interest. Thus, the recording acts inject inquiry 
and actual notice into the equation by typically requiring B to be a 
"bona fide purchaser," "good faith purchaser," or "purchaser without 
notice." 
That is all well and good. But, the rule of inquiry notice should not 
be expanded from protecting the legitimate interests of the first purchas-
er and used to surprise the subsequent purchaser. Inquiry notice c;hould 
not be utilized as a means to deprive property rights from a later 
purchaser who could not fairly know or suspect that there was a prior 
interest. That is what happened, though, in Sanborn. 
Inquiry notice in Sanborn. The Michigan Supreme Court in Sanborn 
introduced a high standard of inquiry notice, far beyond the usual. First, 
it required McLean to inspect and inquire about not only lot 86 (i.e., the 
property that he was buying) but also the entire neighborhood-far 
beyond the limits of usual inspection and inquiry. The court expanded 
the burden on purchasers without ever explaining why it did so, even 
though the McLaughlins were the bad actors for failing to record an 
express covenant that would give fair notice to potential buyers and 
would serve the goal of creating an accurate record system. The court got 
that wrong. The standard rule is that one who is searching record title 
only has to search the chain of title for the lot that he is buying, i.e., lot 
86, not other lots owned by grantorzx_a limit intended to reduce the 
zs See, e.g., Buffalo Academy of' Sacn·d Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y. 242, HJ6 N.K 
42 I 19:lf,J. 
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burden of the search. To discover the basis for an implied reciprocal 
negative easement, however, the Sanborn court was in effect requiring 
McLean to do such a much greater search-he would have had to look at 
the deeds for neighboring lots. 
Next, according to the court, McLean's observation of houses on 
other lots plus knowledge from the abstract that there had been a 
common subdivider of the area should have led him to conclude that 
there was an implied covenant burdening his lot 86 even though nothing 
was recorded against his property. This would been a tough task, 
requiring the application of s<.:ant fads to an arrnne legal principle, even 
if the dodrine of implied reciprocal restrictions had been well known. 
But this would have been an espe<.:ially difficult feat in 1910 or 1911 
when Md,ean wm; rnntemplating his <.:ontrnd to purchase since the 
Sanborn v. McLean is arguably the first case to have declan!d the theory 
of restrictions based on implied reciprocal negative easements!~!, 
Moreover, even assuming that McLean had been able to forecast the 
Michigan court's future adoption of the concept of' implied reciprocal 
negative easements, guessed that the court now expanded the require-
ment of the buyer's inspection to include the entire neighborhood, and 
that this inspection should had led him to speculate if there were an 
implied mvenant burdening his lot, what would he have actually 
learned? ff McLean had searched some of the titles of' neighboring lots at 
random to see if there were a pattern of restrictions evidencing a general 
plan, he might have found no express restrictions at all in the deeds he 
looked at-remember only 53 of 91 had express restrictions in their 
<.:hains of title! There would thus have been no hint to him of the 
restrictive sc;heme. Indeed, the reasonable inf'erence from checking a 
random selection of' other lots in the subdivision would be that some had 
restrictions but others did not. Given all of this, the finding of inquiry 
notice was incorrect. McLean unfairly lost property rights to a claim that 
there is no way that he could have known about. 
Other facts not cited by the court support the view that Mc;Lean 
could not have fairly known about the restrictions. Plaintiff Sanborn 
himself testified that there were other gasoline stations a bloc;k or so 
away from ihe subdivision/' raising questions about what should have or 
have not seemed evident to McLean about the presence of an implied 
covenant when he bought. Moreover, the record lac;ks testimony about 
the state of' the subdivision at the time McLean signed his rnntrad of' 
:!!I The cas{' n•cL•iv('d noticP f'ron1 con1llH'lltaton; at lhl' tin1l'. ~{'(', P.g., Charil•~ E. Clark, 
Assignahility of' 1•:asPnwn!s, Profits and l~quit.ablc• lfost rictions, :!8 Yale• L .. J. I :rn I 1928-
19281; l{c,cpnt Casl's, 10 Minn. L. l{Pv. (il9 I IH2Gi; Sanborn v. McLC'an, \) Bi-Monthly L. 
Rc•v. I U. Dd. I :n I 192G- I 92fi I. 
:Ill Record, supra note 4, at 71. 
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sale. The court should have focused on that moment to determine what 
McLean could have and should have understood about the neighbor-
hood-that is the time that inquiry is required. Subsequent changes in 
the area and the condition at the date of litigation are not relevant. The 
trial court should have found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their 
burden of proving that McLean did not adequately inspect at the time of 
purchase. 
How prevalent were subdivision covenants at that time? Would a 
typical lot buyer expect that lots would generally be burdened by a 
covenant? If lots were usually sold only with covenants, then it would be 
an easier leap for the court to find that McLean should have inferred 
that the neighborhood was subject to restrictions, thus making the 
inquiry notice argument stronger. A review of classified advertisements 
in contemporary newspapers reveals no common or prevalent practice of 
advertising the presence of covenants in the sale of vacant lots. For 
example, the classified section of the Detroit News of Sunday, January 
16, 1910 (around the time that McLean purchased his lot) had 35 ads 
under "For Sale-Vacant Lots," with many of the ads listing multiple 
properties. This section of the classifieds contained ads for individual 
lots, such as lot 86. Of the !35 ads (which ranged in size from 2 lines to 20 
lines, with most being 6 to 10 lines), none said that the lots were under 
restriction, three lots specifically noted that they were not restricted, and 
the rest of the ads were silent on the issue.:11 Thus, the ads did not signal 
to consumers about covenants or restrictions, making it less likely that 
restrictions would be in a buyer's consciousness. 
While one has to be careful to draw too many inferences from such 
thin evidence, it seems unlikely that the average buyer of a lot in an 
existing subdivision (such as McLean) would have had covenants on his 
mind; so, a buyer would be less likely to be on inquiry notice of implied 
covenants in an area. Covenants do get mentioned in large ads for new, 
large-scale subdivisions being mass-marketed by a subdivider,::~ hut these 
ads appear only occasionally in the classifieds. Note that such advertise-
ments are not for the type of lot purchased by McLean in 1910, i.e., a 
single lot being sold by a subsequent purchaser, rather than the original 
developers, in a subdivision where all the lots had already been sold by 
the original developers_:i:i 
:n Tlw Dd.roit Npws, Classif"1c•d SPc., l/1(1/1910, p. D. 
::~ For l'Xamph·, the ad for North Woodward Lois in Tlw Detroit News, Classifil'd 
Section, Sunday, 6/:,/1910, p. IO or !he orn• for Marshland Bou!Pvanl Subdivision in Tlw 
])ptroit NPws, Classifil'd Spdion, Sunday 6/12/1910, p. (i. 
:i:: Tlw vast majority of Uw lots wne initially sold before I 900 and a handful Wl'rl' 
i11itially sold i11 1901-1\HJ7, l,pforc' McLPan pun:hased his lot. l{ecord, at 18-2:l. 
'· 
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In light of these facts and circumstances, McLean's inspection and 
inquiry as a potential buyer seemed more than adequate under the law 
as it existed prior to Sanborn. His uncontrnverted testimony indicated 
that he examined the abstract of title for lot 86 before buying and saw no 
restriction on the title'11 and that his seller assured him that the lot was 
not restricted_:~, Even the Supreme Court of" Michigan stated in its 
opinion that "we do not say Mr. McLean should have asked his neigh-
bors about rcstrictions.":H; The finding of inquiry noticl! is illogical and 
bad law. 
The Real Story of Sanborn v. McLean? 
The story that the Michigan Supreme Court told in its opinion does 
not add up. Facts and policy do not support the stretching of the court to 
imply a covenant and to find inquiry notice binding the McLeans. So 
what was really going on? 
Not Consumer Protection 
I do not think that Sanborn is a consumer-protection narrative-i.e., 
where the court protects the expectations of the rnnsumer buyers in the 
subdivision and delivers to them the residential scheme that they bar-
gained and paid for but the developer (due to malfeasance or misfea-
sance) failed to deliver. It does not appear to be that story for various 
reasons. First, 1925 is well before the advent of the era of significant 
pro-consumer decisions. Caveat emptor, privity n,les, and non-interven-
tion in markets were the ethos. If a court was going to innovatl! in 
consumer protection law, this would be an unlikely place to start. 
Moreover, the factual record and the subdivision homeowners do not 
make for a particularly strong consumer protection case for the plain-
tiffs. The record shows a lack of due diligence, even a lack of a minimum 
of care, by the homeowners to determine ( before they bought) whether 
the subdivision was under a general plan of restrictions. Owners testified 
that when they purchased their lots they were "told,"'17 "advised,"'1~ or 
"understood"'111 that the neighborhood was under restriction. This infor-
mation came from their sellers (not the McLaughlins but subsequent 
owners) or was based on the witnesses' general impressions of the 
:ii lkconl, suprn 11o(l' 4 at 117, lfiO. 
::., Id. at. l:iO. 
:H; 20fi N.W.2d at. 498. 
::, Rl'cord, supra 110!.l' 4. at (i6 ISanlior11·s (estirno11yl. 
::s Id. at. 9:l 1Fred(•rick W. Minton·, testinl<lnyl. 
:1!1 Jd. a( 108 ((;porgl' S. Fil'ld"s (.(•st.irnonyl. 
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neighborhood. None of these nine witnesses 111 consulted a lawyer or other 
professional for an opinion at to the existence of the neighborhood 
scheme. Moreover, three of the nine witnesses who testified that they 
thought that the whole neighborhood was restricted admitted that they 
had no express restrictions in their titles. 11 The testimony reveals a 
passive group of buyers, who accepted casual, vague statements about 
the area's "common reputation" 12 without following up or inquiry. 
Consider the example of' George S. Field's testimony for plaintiffs: 
Q I direct examination I: Did you make any inquiry or receive any 
information at the time you bought, as to whether property on 
Collinwood avenue was restricted for residential purposes? 
A: I understood it was for residential purposes. 
* * 
Q /cross examination/: You find in your abstract absolutely no 
restrictions on your lot and never had been since it was platted? 
A: I took it on representation of the neighborhood. It was platted 
and used for residential purposes only. "1 
You may be surprised to learn that Field, who based on his testimony 
apparently followed a "no diligence" approach, was a lawyer! In light of 
this passivity, the owners' reliance on a supposed scheme of' restrictions 
seems unwarranted or suspect, making them less than ideal consumer-
protection plaintiffs in 1925. 
Had these owners been more assertive, they could have forced the 
issue earlier, prevented the situation with McLean from arising, and 
helped to improve the record system. Thus, when the initial lot buyers 
from the McLaughlins purchased their properties they could have asked 
to see a legally binding instrument creating the restrictive scheme in the 
neighborhood and requested that it be recorded as a condition of their 
purchase. That would have made the covenants express against all of the 
lots and a matter of record for all potential purchasers. Even subsequent 
buyers from original purchasers should have required recorded documen-
tation of the supposed restriction, which would have avoided the problem 
and made the recording system better. Instead, they chose to ignore the 
problem~which ultimately landed in the McLeans' lap. 
11
' Sanborn, Minton, Elmer W. Voorheis, Fn•derick i\. Mat.thews, Field, Arthur TuUl!•, 
Francis(;_ Harv,•y, George W. Hurd, Edmund D. ,Jackson, Id. at 6(i-140. 
11 Id. at G7-/i8 1SanhornJ, % !Minton I, 108 WiPld1. 
12 Id. at. 9:l I Minton). 
1:1 1d.at 108,109. 
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When courts innovate by creating new rights and duties, they 
usually do so in cases with sympathetic plaintiffs whose circumstances 
help make the case for the legal innovation. But of the three groups of 
actors in this story-the McLaughlins, the subdivision owners, and the 
McLeans-placing liability on the McLeans makes the least sense in 
terms of moral blameworthiness and efficiency considerations. I have 
discussed the roles of the owners and the McLeans. As to the McLaugh-
lins, the record is unclear why they acted the way that they did and 
created an ambiguous common scheme development. On one hand, they 
may have been playing it both ways-including residential restrictions in 
deeds where that would pk!ase a residential buyer but omitting restric-
tions in deeds where a potential commercial user might come along and 
seek an unrestricted lot (at a premium price). They may have been 
unsure if the project would sell as a residential development, so they may 
have been trying to keep flexibility by being vague and inconsistent 
about the restrictive scheme. On the other hand, these were the early 
days of residential subdivisions and the state of the art was not well 
developed. 11 In later times a more sophisticated practice would develop 
where the subdivider would record a declaration of restrictions against 
the entire subdivision before any conveyances are made and create a 
binding scheme-hut that may not have yet been a common practice. 1" It 
does not appear from the record that the McLaughlins had legal counsel 
in the conveyancing and so perhaps the McLaughlins were just careless 
in preparing the deeds. They, like many developers, may have run into 
financial problems and had to sell lots at any terms in order to keep 
afloat. Much is unknown. 
What we do know is that Sanborn u. McLean does not look like a 
consumer protection story. This was not a pro-consumer era and these 
consumers are not great plaintiffs. Two other narratives may be the true 
story of" Sanborn. 
Zoning by Judicial Fiat 
By the late 19th century, Detroit had become a mqjor industrial city. 
The discovery of iron ore in the upper peninsula of Michigan, good canal 
connections to Detroit, and extensive public utilities were key factors in 
the city's emergence as a center for heavy industry. 11; It produced and 
wholesaled goods for the national and international markets. 1' Auto 
11 For a history of' large-scale subdivision, seP Marl' /\. W<'iss, TIH' l{is,, of' t.lw 
Co1111nu11ity Builders I I/J/-171. 
i:, :-,,,,, Korngold, supra not,, 17, * 9.0:l. 
11;Art.hur M. Woodf',ml, This is lldrnit: 1701 :WO! 7:i-77. H:i-/-16 1Wayn,, Stat,, Univ. 
Pn,ss 200 I I. 
17 Sid,w_v (;laz,,r. Detroit: A St.ucly in llrhan lkv,•lopnwnt :iO IBook,nan Assol'iatt>s, 
Nc•w York, 19(i:il. 
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manufacturing was a huge engine driving the local economy, beginning 
in the 1890s and growing into the early decades of the 20th century. For 
example, employment in auto manufacturing in Detroit rose from 7,200 
workers in 1908 to 120,000 in 1916. 1s 
During the early twentieth century, the population of Detroit was 
migrating away from the central core of the city to newly developed 
portions of the city, "out Woodward"-to the area in which Green Lawn 
Subdivision was located. 111 Various factors contributed to this. First, the 
population of the Detroit metro area boomed during that time, and more 
housing was needed. The area had 340,843 people in 1900, 524,615 in 
1910, 1,186,282 in 1920, and 1,974,471 in 1930-a 479cy, increase in 30 
years?' Newcomers were both native-born and immigrants, drawn by 
economic opportunities.:, 1 
Additionally, special factors in Detroit drew population away from 
the central city. The Detroit metro area had higher automobile use than 
other cities, leading to an outward movement of population.''2 Henry 
Ford built his automobile plants outside the prior metro area, pulling 
people along with them.:.:i Neighborhoods thus developed outside of the 
central core. 
As in other American cities, workers sought residential settings as a 
refuge from the noise, pollution, and activity of commercial and industri-
al life. It was in these areas that citizens sought to raise their families 
and find peace and self-fulfillment.:, 1 Although today there are competing 
views as to the benefit of isolating residential from other activities/:, 
1K Clazer, supra note 4G, at 7fi. 
111 Glazer, supra note 4fi, al 76; see Woodford, supra no!.P 4fi, at 88; HPatlwr B. Barrow, 
The American Disc,asc, of Growth: Henry Ford and tlw Metropolitization of Detroit., 1920-
1940, in Robert. Lewis (ed.i, Manufacturing Suburbs: Building Work and Horne on the 
Metropolitan Fringe 200-220, at 211 !Temple Univ. Press 2004). 
·•
11 Michigan Planning Commission, A Study of Subdivision in the Detroit. Metropolitan 
Area (Lansing, MI 19:lGJ. 
:,i Woodford, supra note 4fi, at Sfi-86. 
·•
2 
.June Manning Thomas, Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar 
Detroit 14 !The ,Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1997). 
:,:i Barrow, supra nok 48, at 201. 
:,1 See Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property 
Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, fi(i Amer. 
U.L. Rl,v. lfi2fi, lfi:l6-lfi:l7 (2007); see generally John Stilgoe, Borderland: Origins of the 
American Suburb, 1820-19:39 I 19881. 
:,:, See Andres Duany, Elizabl'th Plater-Zyherk & Jeff Speck, Suburban Nation: The 
Hise of Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream llfi-133 (paperback ed. 2001 i 
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throughout much of the 20th century this represented consumer prefer-
ences and was considered socially beneficial. 
The rapid expansion of Detroit, however, was not easy. The growth 
was largely unregulated. Although discussions about instituting zoning 
began in Detroit soon after New York City passed its zoning ordinance in 
1916/'1; Detroit did not enact a zoning ordinance until 1940."7 Thus the 
city had no real tools with which to plan, control, and manage land use 
and growth. The city's rapid unplanned expansion concerned many of 
Detroit's leading citizens. Harvey Whipple, the chief executive of thli 
American Concrete Institute, in 1919 called for the passage of a Detroit 
zoning ordinance to address unregulated growth: 
Detroit's growth has been like Topsy's; it has been without plan; it 
has happened,· it has occurred as the immediate occasion dictated 
and individual development has alwayH been paramount to the 
public good. There has been no scheme by which investors could 
be reaHonably sure of the values of their property.''s 
Some thought the private sectors' market's response insufficient to 
deal with the rapid industrialization and expansion?' A 19;35 study by 
the Michigan Planning Commission described excessive subdividing that 
left surplus subdivided land, tax delinquencies, and problems with local 
government finance. 1;11 The study noted that "lal fr!w well planned 
subdivisions arc to be found, but on the whole the platted lands arc cut 
up into lots designed for the immediate advantage of speculative opera-
tors, and are not patterned for the best ultin1dte use."1; 1 The study 
lcriticizi11g sprawling n•sic!t-ntial an•asl: l{obPr( llruegc•niann, Sprawl: /\ Compact I listory 
l~00G I I l'avoring c'xpansion ol' n•sidPn( ial an·asJ. 
:,,; Scl' Edward M. Bassdt. Sprl'ading ol' Zoning Law: Cit ic•s All ( )wr ( :ount 1·y l<'ollow 
Exam pl,, or N<'w York, 'I'IH' Nc•w York Time's, 11411 !l20, p. S 1 ~: ,Jan Krnsnowi,,cki, i\holish 
Zoning, ;n Syr. L. l{,,v. 71 fl, 72:)-724 I Hl801. 
;->7 lit tp://www .detroit1ni,gov/Legi~-dat ivl'/ Boards( '.om 1nissi<>ns i( '.ity J>lan ning{ \1111,nissi(lll 1 
plan11i11g_mission.ht.rn I last visited 7;1;'()81. 
:;,, Harvey Whippll', City !'Ian Commission lkgins Its (;rm( Task of llringing Ord,•r 
Out of Detroit's Chaos, Dl'Lroit Saturday Nig·hl, :l/ri/1919, p. ~. quot.Pd in Barrnw, suprn 
no(l' 48, at 218-219. S,,,, also Daniel M. lllul's(o1H', DPt.roit"s City lkaut.iful and tlw 
l'rohlcm or Conrnwrc<', -17 ,Journal or tlw Society of Architl'durnl Historians 2,1G 119881. 
For background on l Iarv<'.Y WhipplP, SC'<' http: /www.com-rl'tC'.org,g<'1wral:Al listoryoL\CI. 
pdr., last visit.Pd (kt.ol)('r 16, 2008. 
··•!1 For a discussion or thl' dawn of th<' zoning <'ra. S<'P t.lw chapL<•r hy David Callic•s in 
this volume,, Village' ol' Euclid v. AmhlPr l{<'alty Co.; William T. llogart., .. Trading l'lac·"s"": 
Tlw !fol,, of' Zoning in l'rnmot.ing and Discouraging· Int.ranH't.rnpolit.an Trad,,, [i 1 Cas,, W. 
!{l's. L. l{l'v. 697 12001 I 
,;o Study, supra notl' ·19, at 1. 
,;i Id. at 2. 
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maintained that "low quality residence sections, many of which may be 
characterized as rural slums, have sprung up over the entire area, and 
these not only give rise to difficult relief, education, and health problems, 
but also have a strangulating effect upon the development of higher 
grade residential areas. " 1;~ 
It is in this setting that Judge Driscoll tried the case of Sanborn u. 
McLean. And here entered the key actor, in my view, of the Sanborn u. 
McLean story~T. Glenn Phillips. Phillips gave a bravura performance at 
the trial, shaped the story of the case, and sold it to Judge Driscoll. 
Phillips' version is the story that the trial court adopted and the 
Michigan Supreme Court ratified. 
Phillips was called as a witness by the plaintiffs. His testimony 
indicated that he was an architect and city planner and had previously 
served for nine years as a commissioner on the Detroit City Planning 
Commission_i;:i Since 1919 and continuing at the time of the trial, Phillips 
was a consultant with the Commission. Phillips had done work with 
other communities on city planning issues, including zoning questions. 
He testified that he had familiarity with the nature and use of properties 
in the Green Lawn Subdivision area.'; 1 While not discussed in the record, 
Phillips was an author of articles and reports on traffic problems and 
solutions in Detroiti;" and city tree planting_i;i; Subsequent to the decision 
in Sanborn, he consulted to Grosse Pointe Village, Grosse Pointe Farms, 
and Gross Pointe Park, Michigan to advise in the preparation of those 
villages' zoning ordinances.';7 He was also a successful practitioner of 
landscape architecture_l;H 
In my view, however, Phillips' testimony had nothing to do with the 
key is::mes of the case. He first testified on direct that allowing a gas 
station would be "detrimental to the community"1;!, as it would intrude 
i;~ lei. at :l. 
i;:i Ifocord, supra note 4, at 76. 
i;i Id. at 77. 
i;s T. Glenn Phillips, The Automohik: Its l'rovincl' and Its Problems, 11 ti Annals of the 
Anwr. Academy of' Political and Social Sci. 241 119241. 
lili 'I'. Gll•nn Phillips, City Tree Planting, Detroit City Plan Commission, lfoport No. I, 
R,•v. like. Hll41. 
i;7 (;rosse Pointe Civic News, vol.4, no.:l, SPpt., 192/i, at 2; Gross Pointe Civic NPws, vol. 
:i., No. 10, April, 1928, at :l. 
i;s S,•e, l'.g., photo of' Henry and Clara Ford homL', http://cll'troit1701.org/Forc!Home. 
htm. 
i;!J ]{peon!, supra note 4, at 77, 78, 79, 80. 
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into "a highly developed residential section."'" This might be sound 
advice to a subdivider and part of a recommendation to include express 
reciprocal residential covenants in a subdivision, but it does not address 
the issue of the case: i.e., whether McLean's lot was subject to a 
covenant. Moreover, Phillips' general testimony that there should be no 
commercial uses in residential districts shed no light on the nuisance 
issue, since nuisance law is all about balancing competing uses in the 
same neighborhood. 
Phillips, though, did more-he advocated for the techniques USl'd hy 
public zoning and extolled the virtues of this model. Phillips' testimony 
supported the typical zoning practice of his timc-i.e., the division of' the 
city into separate zones, each with specified uses. This segregation of 
residential, commercial, and manufacturing activitit!S was a key as1wct of 
early zoning. 71 He testified that the Green Lawn area "is a highly 
developed residential section of the city and should be specialized as such 
and any intrusion allowed to come in there would break down that 
residential character." 72 As a planner, he thought he knew what the city 
needed and how land should be allocated for particular uses: "We have 
enough business, commercial use in the City of Detroit f'or f'our and one-
half million people.'' 
Phillips not only advocated a vision consistent with zoning concepts, 
but also in his testimony he directly favored the passage of a zoning 
ordinance in Detroit. He painted an attractive picture of Detroit if' such a 
governmental zoning scheme came into l!xistcnce: 
[ T[he proposed zoning ordinance which places the city in districts 
and allows the city to grow in orderly manner, with husiness in 
certain sections and residences in others, specialize tlw whole com-
munity, and allows it to grow, because as a city grows there an• a 
great many specialized districts .... 71 
And Phillips had the self-confidence, or was it the aJToganCl\ to sell 
his dreams. He believed that planners and zoning officials, rather than 
markets, could best set the value and success of properties. Consider this 
exchange during cross examination: 
Q: Out on Second avenue there are a number of' gas stations? 
711 Id. at 7H. 
71 SPP, t•.g· .. Villag,, of' Euclid v. /\1nblPr l{!'alty Co., '27'2 li.S. :Hiii I !()'2(i1. Traditio11al 
"Euclid,·a11" zo11i11g co11LL0 111plat.,·d sl'para1'• zorn•s. In contrast, ,·111Tt•11t planning t ill'ory 
fi.1vors 1nix<.'d-L1S{', to e11t·ouragt• lll'ighhorhond shopping and <.'Ollllllt1nity t·olH·sion. St•<.• 
Duany ,,t al., supra notp ii4. 
'" l{l'cord, supra not,· 4, a! 79. 
7
'
1 Id. at HO. 
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A: Yes, sir; shouldn't be there. 
Q: But they arc there now? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: It is your opinion that they shouldn't be there? 
A: No, basing it on statistics, facts what other people-71 
His expert opinion, not people's preferences expressed through market 
choices, were what mattered to him. 
Moreover, in Phillips' mind, zoning was inevitable, it was the future, 
it was coming to Detroit, and so it was time to get on board: 
(~: I cross examination I: You don't propose to tell this court you can 
tell the court certain districts in this City of Detroit that are going 
to be good districts and those that arc not? 
A: Never can tell but there is going to be a plan very soon which 
will allow a certain district to be allowed for residential, others for 
manufacture, and so on. 
Q: You are not familiar enough at the present time to tell this 
court or anyone else, what certain districts in Detroit are going to be 
business districts and what not in the next ten or twenty years? 
A: Yes, I think we are. 7:; 
Judge Driscoll certainly seemed to be a believer in the planning 
gospel Phillips preached. He wanted to hear Phillips' story. Defense 
counsel made five lengthy, and correct in my view, objections during 
Phillips' direct testimony claiming that the testimony was not material 
or relevant to the legal issues before the court?; Counsel also objected to 
the latitude that the court gave Phillips to spin out his story in 
"narrative form." 77 Counsel was again right on this issue-Phillips' 
testimony reads like a professor lecturing on the virtues of zoning and 
planning. But Judge Driscoll wanted to hear Phillips tell his tale and 
ruled against the defense each time it objected. 
Phillips' vision may have been a good one, and may have seemed 
especially appealing in 1920s Detroit. But it had nothing to do with the 
case of Sanborn u. McLean. The issue in the case was whether the 
parties, by consent and using private law, had created restrictions on 
McLean's property. Phillips instead told a story of the supposed benefits 
of public regulation of land, through the imposition of zoning by govern-
ment on a non-consenting individual. One can only speculate, but 
71 Id. at 83. 
7:; Id. at 82. 
71i Id. al 77, 78, 7H, 80. 
77 Id. at 77; se,• abo at 80. 
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Phillips' utopian picture of a future with uses of land segregated and 
controlled could well have motivated the court to imply a covenant on 
the defendant's land, despite the legal and policy weaknesses of such a 
decision. Did Phillips thus encourage Judge Driscoll to engage in improp-
er "judicial zoning?" 
Even if one agrees with the notion that the public should regulate 
land, this should be the province of the legislature not the courts. Judge 
Driscoll should not have been imposing non-consensual land regulation 
on individual owners as the agent of government. Under our Constitu-
tional system, such decisions are left to democratically-elected and ac-
countable legislatures, who can best represent Uw will of the people on 
how our precious land resources should he utilized and regulated. Public 
rq,11.dation of land involves hard choices, evolving conditions, needs, and 
techniques, and accounting for different world views. Regulatory deci-
sions balancing these competing interests should not be arrogated to 
futurist judges or unelected expert bureaucrats such as Phillips. 
So, one alternative story of Sanborn u. McLean may be that of a 
compelling proponent of public zoning convincing the court that regulat-
ing land and :-;egregating residential uses was es:-:ential for social and 
economic success, with the court then misapplying that lesson to a 
private dispute over a consensual restrictive covenant. This narrative 
would explain the bizarre result at the trial and appellate levels. 
Professional Courtesy 
There is another likely story in Sanborn u. McLean~profcssional 
courtesy or what we might perhaps better Lenn sycophancy. Arthur J. 
Tuttle, Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan was one of the other homeowncrn on Collingwood Avenue. 
He testified as a witness for the plaintiffs, stating that he occupied the 
house with his family and de.sired to "live and die" there.'' He bought a 
vacant lot there since it was a "high-grade neighborhood."•!' He said that 
a gasoline station would decrease his property's valm' and that he would 
have not purchased his lot if he had not thought that it was a residen-
tial-only neighborhood."11 
This was a powerful witness for the plaintiffa~a sitting federal 
judge with twelve years on the bench appearing in a state court proceed-
ing, defending his home." 1 Even better, both Judge Tuttle"" and Judge 
•·'Id.at l!H-119. 
7!1 Id. at I 19. 
"
11 Id.at 119-120. 
"
1 ,Judg,· Tutti,· had l,e,•n appoint.l'd in 1912. llistor.v ol'tlw Sixth (:ircuit. http:uwww.ca 
(i. uscour!s.govllih _hisUcourtsid ist rid 'Ir 20cou rt; Ml/1•:IlM l;judg,•s;ajl -hio.ht ml I last visil !'d 
,Jul:v 17. 20081. 
S2 Jd. 
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Driscoll8'1 were Republicans. Judge Tuttle was active in electoral politics, 
even running unsuccessfully in 1924 for the U.S. Senate nomination 
while still on the bench. 81 So, did Judge Driscoll, holding an elective 
office, stretch to accommodate the wishes of this impressive and impor-
tant fellow party member? Perhaps the McLeans were up against forces 
far greater than the legal issues at hand. We cannot know, but this may 
be another story that explains the Sanborn u. McLean result. 
The Final Story 
In Sanborn u. McLean, the Supreme Court of Michigan took an 
overly expansive view of implied covenants and inquiry notice. This 
version has been binding precedent in Michigan and influential on courts 
in other jurisdictions. But the story that the court told is troubling for 
legal and policy reasons. I have suggested that there may have been 
other narratives-zoning by judicial fiat and professional courtesy-that 
may better explain how the court reached its decision. This may be of 
some comfort to those struggling to understand the illogical story that 
the court told, but is less solace to those who must live with the reality of 
the court's strange holdings. 8:; 
.~:i http://politicalgrnveyard.com/bio/driseoll.ht111l#OPlJO(~,JDJA (last visited July l 5, 
2008). 
81 http://www.ea6. uscou rts.gov/1 ib_hist/cou rts/district'lr 20eou rt/M 1/EDM 1/judges/ajt-bio. 
html I last visited July I 7, 2008!. 
x:; If you want to sL,e the McLean lot today, look at Google satellite. http://maps.googlt-. 
com/maps?sourceid = navclient&aq =Collingwood'!t 20Avcnue&ie= UTF-8&rlz = I T4(WRC_ 
enUS218US218&q=Collingwood f Avenue&oe= UTF-8&um= l&sa=N&tab=wl, last vis-
ited October 17, 2008. Note the single residential building on the lot Ion the northeast 
corner of the intersection of Cc,llingwood and Second), as well as the house, and vaeant lots 
currently on Collingwood. 
